Section 1328(f) was added to the Bankruptcy Code in October 2005 by BAPCPA. This page analyzes the empirical effect of its introduction by comparing pre-2005 counterfactual rates with post-2005 actual rates in the dataset.
| Period | Successive Ch.13 filers in sample | Within lookback (or counterfactual) | Counterfactual / actual rate |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1993-1995 (pre-BAPCPA) | 73 | 21 | ~28% counterfactual |
| 1996-2000 (pre-BAPCPA) | 651 | 44 | ~7% counterfactual |
| 2001-2005 (transition) | 3,719 | 282 | ~7.6% |
| 2006-2010 (post-BAPCPA) | 2,475 | 156 | ~6.3% |
| 2011-2015 (post-BAPCPA) | 2,889 | 183 | ~6.3% |
| 2016-2020 (post-BAPCPA) | 3,634 | 189 | ~5.2% |
| 2021-2026 (post-BAPCPA) | 2,343 | 143 | ~6.1% |
Two patterns stand out:
The 1993-1995 counterfactual rate (~28%) is dramatically higher than later years. Most likely explanation: the early-90s consumer bankruptcy environment had high recidivism rates because Chapter 13 was being used as a workout tool by debtors who didn't complete the first plan and tried again quickly. The dataset's small sample size in those years (only ~73 successive filers identified) makes the rate volatile.
From 2005 onward, the rate stabilizes in the 5-7% range. Several factors contribute:
The post-2005 rate doesn't fall to zero. The remaining cases are:
The Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules accepted 26-BK-3 in March 2026. The proposed amendment to Bankruptcy Rule 4004 would require § 1328(f) screening at the petition stage, catching lookback-barred cases at intake rather than at discharge. The empirical work on this page supports the committee's analysis (Tab 4C, p. 125, fn. 4).
If 26-BK-3 is adopted in final form, future iterations of this dataset should show the post-2005 5-7% rate decline further as the procedural screening reduces the population of pro-se filers who unknowingly trigger the bar.